There wasn't much to report about real economic progress in Afghanistan. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) tempered good news of economic growth -- a whopping 30 percent last year, and maybe 20 percent this year -- with a warning that Afghanistan's economy is distorted and threatened by the drug trade. Its bean counters believe that the export of opium and its derivatives, which yielded about $2.5 billion last year, now accounts for half of Afghanistan's GDP. Production is fast recovering to its 1999 record level (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 20 February, 29 May, and 5 June 2003). Without major intervention, it said, the country will slide into being a "narco-state where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of drug traffickers." Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai agreed (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 25 September 2003), saying several ministries are already approaching "narco-mafia" status. The World Bank was scarcely more upbeat, noting that life expectancy in Afghanistan still hovers around 40.

There was at least some determined talk, and money to back it up. The head of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, gave a pep talk, saying his organization will spend $300 million in Afghanistan in 2004 on reconstruction and micro-financing. The bulk of the money will come from the United States, EU members, Japan, and Canada. The U.S. delegation came out of the meeting in high spirits. By their own account, they managed to get other donors to match Washington's boosted funding for Afghanistan next year. Half of the $1.2 billion the United States plans to dole out will be targeted to rebuilding the national police and army. The rest will be spent on reconstruction and improving ministries.

The United States and others may also make use of an existing scheme that funnels money in the form of block grants to villages where, at least, funds get stolen at the micro level. Ahmadzai sang a depressingly familiar tune: spend now or pay later. All donations have been gratefully received, went his chorus, but how about some more. He reckons his country needs $30 billion over the next five years to make a go of it. He will be lucky to get half that.

A good chunk of the money promised over 15 months -- $1.8 billion out of $2.1 billion -- actually materialized. Yet, that amounts to an annual $67 per Afghan, which pales in comparison with what was spent on each East Timorese and Bosnian following their civil wars. Afghans have good reason to wonder why they receive so much less.

Hovering on the fringe was the Russian Federation, which claims to be owed money by Afghanistan. Russian diplomats say Kabul is in debt to them for close to $10 billion -- by what calculation is unclear (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 25 September 2003). They say Russia would be ready to settle, in deference to hard times, for 20 percent. No chance, say diplomats. But Russia does not really expect to be paid. The issue is one of leverage. By forgiving Soviet-era debt, it hopes to win favorable agreements on mining, oil exploration, and the import of machinery.

In conclusion, while the Afghanistan donors meeting tried to put a brave face on the realities on the ground, unless peace, security, and a departure from a culture of warlordism is enforced, Afghanistan may find itself again at the mercy of drug dealers and terrorists.

J.M. Ledgard is a journalist who covers Afghanistan and a freelancer for RFE/RL.