According to the German Colonel Kurt Schiebold, the unit of German troops in Konduz "will cooperate with the Afghan security forces to ensure that there is a safe environment for Afghans, United Nations staff, and members of other international organizations to do reconstruction work and provide humanitarian aid." In short, the Germans will be working as part of a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) -- an idea formulated mainly by the United States, to provide security for aid workers under military protection (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 30 January 2003).

Currently there are four PRTs in Afghanistan, two of which are led by the United States in Gardayz, Paktia Province and Konduz, Konduz Province. One PRT is commanded by the United Kingdom in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province, and one by New Zealand in Bamiyan, Bamiyan Province. NATO hopes to increase the number of PRTs to eight or 10. Germany's assumption of leadership of the PRT in Konduz will allow the United States to relocate its troops to more volatile regions, such as southern and eastern Afghanistan.

NATO's First Out-Of-Area Challenge

When it took command of ISAF on 11 August, NATO embarked on a mission outside of Europe for the first time in its 54-year history (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 14 August 2003). As such, NATO officially began to engage the Greater Middle East -- an area usually understood to extend from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan in the east. Taking command of ISAF, limited to Kabul initially, was not such a difficult task for NATO, as ISAF had already established itself and was operating in a relatively secure environment.

Moreover, the four countries that commanded ISAF -- Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands -- are all NATO members, making the transition in ISAF's chain of command virtually seamless.

Expansion of ISAF to Konduz and to other potentially more dangerous locations in Afghanistan may, however, test NATO's planning and foresight.

Konduz, by Afghan standards, is a relatively safe zone. The Germans may not have to deal with fighting the remnants of Al-Qaeda, the neo-Taliban, or the array of warlords in their island of peace. But unless all of Afghanistan becomes warlord and terrorist free, the Germans -- trying to ensure a safe environment for aid workers -- may be drawn into an unknown, murky battleground.

Konduz is an important narcotics zone in a country that tops the world in production of poppy cultivation (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 20 February, 29 May, and 5 June 2003). Even if it remains safe, and the presence of the German troops allows the United Nations and other organizations to tackle the poppy cultivation problem there, NATO will not have accomplished its mission. NATO officials have already stated that the main challenge for the alliance is success in Afghanistan bringing about more stability throughout the country as a whole. The alliance is well aware of the need to expand into the southeastern parts of the country if it is to truly attain this goal.

Is NATO Ready?

It was Afghanistan, the last battlefield of the Cold War, that led to the tragic events of 11 September 2001. NATO's first challenge in the war on terrorism began in Afghanistan as well. At the dawn of the 21st century, terrorism is the most important immediate threat to the Western world. Most of the anti-Western terrorist activities have had their origins in the Greater Middle East, especially if this geographical concept is extended to include Pakistan. As such, NATO's shift of attention from the threat posed by the former Soviet Union to terrorism seems a natural and logical progression. A major question that remains unanswered, however, is whether or not NATO is facing this challenge with solid unity of purpose and action.

To be sure, NATO has more than sufficient military capability to eventually overcome the challenging situation in Afghanistan. It may not have the force structure to deal with small pockets of resistance in the mountains of Afghanistan as of yet, but an alliance decision in Prague in November 2002 offers a hint of what may come. The alliance decided to create a "NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council." NATO decision makers may have had situations such as the mission in Afghanistan in mind. If NATO is forced to engage militarily in Afghanistan, this NRF concept may also be tested.

The major test for NATO is how it will handle operations out of its traditional domain, namely state building. The enemy in Afghanistan is not just the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the neo-Taliban forces. The forces that threaten that country are opposed to the current state-building process underway there. The trickiest part is that some of these forces are made up of the very people on which NATO has to rely on to accomplish its mandate of establishing security.

NATO took a first and daring step when ISAF commander German Lieutenant General Goetz Gliemeroth said on 21 October, "ISAF strongly supports the removal of heavy weapons from Kabul" (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 23 October 2003). What General Gliemeroth said is very much in line with the 2001 Bonn Accords, but the only Afghan faction that possesses heavy weapons in Kabul is headed by the Defense Minister of the Afghan Transitional Administration Marshall Mohammad Qasim Fahim.

For the political maneuverings that are required to establish the necessary security to move the state-building process in Afghanistan forward, NATO needs full commitment of all of its members, if it is going to succeed. It requires not only the political backing of its members collectively, but also troop commitments not only for the expansion of its force beyond Kabul and Konduz, but also for ISAF in Kabul itself. So far at least three members of the alliance -- Canada, France, and Greece -- have publicly declared their unwillingness to contribute more troops than what they already committed either within ISAF or serving within the U.S.-led coalition forces outside Kabul.

Before NATO agreed to commit fully to Afghanistan, in Prague it indicated its willingness to "provide support in selected areas for the next ISAF lead nations [Germany and the Netherlands]." However, the statement concluded, "the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout Afghanistan resides with the Afghans themselves" (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 20 December 2002).

If NATO policymakers still truly believe that Afghans bear the responsibility for providing security in their country, then the very first mission of the alliance to the Greater Middle East has begun on the wrong footing. However, if NATO addresses the challenge in Afghanistan with determination and planning, just as it tackled its problems during the Cold War, it may very well prevail in the war on terrorism -- an important component of which is building viable and democratic states.