In its "Background" chapter, the report outlines the process since the December 2001 Bonn agreement. It reports positive and negative realities in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime.

As a positive outcome of the Bonn process, the report cites the rebuilding of some of the administration tools of the government in Kabul, development efforts in the provinces, and the rebuilding and reconstruction of roads, schools, and hospitals in an effort to "contribute to the growth of Afghanistan's economy." Millions of children, including girls, are back in schools, and universities have been reopened in Kabul, Balkh, and other cities across the country. The Afghan National Army has been established and received training, and the Independent Human Rights Commission has been founded in order to monitor and report on human rights abuses.

On the other hand, the report identifies a number of drawbacks and security threats that might hinder the electoral process. "Many of the Bonn agreement's most important provisions have been either forgotten or ignored," reads the paper. Consequently, Afghanistan still faces serious drawbacks regarding democracy, transparency, human rights, and healthy political development. One of the biggest threats to the stability of the country after the election, according to HRW, is the persistent and harsh rule of Afghan warlords and militia leaders throughout the country, together with "no significant disarmament of militia forces nationwide." Also, regarding the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) process in Afghanistan, it "has been reduced to a goal of less than 40 percent, which will not come close to being met, and many militia leaders have retained their autonomous leadership over what are essentially private armies."

The paper further scrutinizes the military factions and autonomous leaders throughout the country and their negative impact on the democratization process in Afghanistan. It stresses several important facts, including that some major political figures in the current government are themselves factional leaders and military commanders. In most provinces across the country, according to HRW, "local military commanders or factional leaders act autonomously as de facto government leaders. Most of them have little tolerance for political freedoms, and use their localized control of army and police to intimidate opponents." The report goes on to conclude, "Afghanistan today resembles more a loose confederation of small fiefdoms than a unified sovereign nation."

HRW also provides an example of the above-mentioned factional conflicts, citing the situation when Afghan Transitional Administration Chairman Hamid Karzai replaced Herat Governor Mohammad Ismail Khan with his own choice for the position. Factional violence ensued between rival groups, leading to some humanitarian groups' departures from that western province.

The problems of women's rights and their participation in the upcoming elections are also highlighted in the HRW briefing. The group concludes that women's rights have improved significantly since the fall of Taliban regime, but it also points out that girls and women still "continue to face severe governmental and social discrimination."

Chapter III of the HRW briefing paper is called "Threats and General Political Repression" and is further divided into three subchapters dealing primarily with the dangers associated with regional warlords and oppression, the security of presidential candidates during campaigning, and "structural electoral problems." The section sheds light on some important drawbacks and threats that stem mostly from a lack of clear democratic process in the provinces, factional repression, and local military leaders' oppression of ordinary Afghans, as well as their political and military rivals. The chapter includes excerpts of interviews with "political organizers and candidates, women activists, voters, human rights monitors, teachers, university faculty, doctors, etc."

HRW goes on to underline some positive results of government reforms after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. It says that in some areas -- such as the cities of Khost, Mazar-e Sharif, and the capital Kabul -- some civil-society groups and political parties are free to organize and hold debates. Also in those areas, freedom of the press is on a level that journalists can report on events without restrictions.

"In most of the country, however, and especially rural areas, there remains a high degree of political repression, and politically active Afghans in every region reports[ed] that they regularly censor themselves for fear that they might face threats or violence at the hands of factional leaders," reads the report.

The briefing quotes an unnamed elections organizer from Kabul as saying: "In Jawzjan, everyone says they support [Abdul Rashid] Dostum in public. In private they know he has done many criminal things and buried many people in the ground. So they say one thing in public and another thing in private. They say they support Dostum, but really they despise him."

Another local civil-society organizer told HRW, "There is no political freedom here because people are afraid. In the past, the commanders committed many crimes against the people"

HRW takes a closer look at the problems and obstacles facing the registration process throughout the country, including echoing many other reports in recent months out of Afghanistan: "In most provinces it is easy to find men and women who admit that they have registered more than once." According to HRW, voter-registration cards have been used to be sold by the potential voters to political parties "who would then presumably photocopy them for use in nominating candidates."

"Monitoring efforts are also anemic," continues the report, stressing that a lack of independent election observers might result in irregularities during the electoral process. These irregularities, according to HRW, are a result of the poor security situation among Afghan provinces, ongoing threats by Taliban insurgents, and factional militia leaders.

The briefing concludes with a summing up of the causes and effects of human rights abuses and their negative impact on current and future political development in Afghanistan. HRW also points out that after the elections, warlords and armed factional leaders across Afghanistan might be appointed as government representatives and thus grab power outside of Kabul and, consequently, "create serious risks for the 2005 local and parliamentary elections, when the factions' control can be used to deliver votes for the factions' candidates."